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A THEORY OF SOCIAL CAUSATION DISCUSSION

ALBION W. SMALL : The substance of what the sociologists are likely to say about the present argument will be in the way of ratification and emphasis. The paper is a masterly survey of the whole field of sociology with the exception of its teleological section. Its main divisions are, first, an introductory account of the function of sociology ; second, proposal of a primary working hypothesis—like response to stimulus ; third, proposal of a secondary working hypothesis concerning the physical side of social causation, namely, the effect of environment upon the composition of the population ; and fourth, suggestions of a programme for interpreting the psychological side of social causation. The paper is in many ways an advance movement in sociological thinking. It seems to me to justify its author's tentative claim. It deserves to exert the constructive influence which I predict that it will have on American thought in our field.

Having the paper as a whole in mind for illustration, rather than specific points in its contents, I will confine myself to a few generalities. A decade ago at a meeting of the American Economic Association in New York, one of our most respected economists frankly declared that, if he could have his way, no sociologist would ever be admitted to a university faculty without permission of the economists. Meanwhile, some of us have found the monotony of life not a little relieved by watching the process by which this genial dogmatist has triturated himself boldly into a most extreme form

of sociology. I want to go on record with the prediction that, in the lifetime of children already born, it will become impossible for anyone to be appointed to the humanities division of the faculty of any first-rate university or college, unless he can creditably sustain an examination in general sociology. I further predict that men of my own age will live to use such terms as ethnologist, historian, economist, political scientist, sociologist, without their present divisive and exclusive connotations.

We shall perceive that if we are thoroughly intelligent about our work, we find it to be concerned not with different material, but with different relations of the same material. We are not one of these specialists to the exclusion of the other. We are one of them primarily and provisionally, but the nearer we get to the real meaning of our material, the more are we all of them ultimately and essentially, in proportions that reflect the real connections of the relations we try to interpret.

The sociologists are actually reaching results that their colleagues in the other departments of human science cannot afford to neglect. These results are not yet to any considerable extent settled formulas of explanation. They are rather, as Professor Giddings has pointed out, apperceptive categories which mark greater or less removes of intelligence from naive conceptions in mere terms of time and space. To emphasize further what we mean by this, I may say it is simply an accident that sociologists have been supposed to be merely a sect of economic schismatics. On the contrary, the relations between the sociologists and the historians are much more fundamental and significant than those with the economists. The sociologist regards the economic

factor in the human process as only one strand in the cable of experience, while the task of the complete thinker is to run back all the strands, to explain their sources and how they are woven together, with the use of the whole after it is woven. Now it may be said that with the rise of the Austrian school economic theory virtually came into line with the method demanded by the sociologist. Carl Menger told me last summer that in his opinion the phrase "Austrian school" has no longer anything but a purely historical meaning. "All that I ever contended for," he said, "has virtually been assimilated by every progressive economist, and there is no longer any reason for distinctions on that line." The Austrian school really fought the decisive battle for the psychological factor among economic forces. The economic element in experience thus takes its place with all the other elements to which the psychologic interpretation is applicable.

But with the historians the case is different. Even with your permission, I might not dare to express myself fully if what I want to say had not virtually been anticipated by the president of the Historical Association in his address at Philadelphia last year. He would probably regard it as a distinct grievance if it were intimated that he is a sociologist, but there are signs that he could qualify for the guild. I am also informed that the same thing is evidently true of the president of the Historical Association this year, as shown by the paper read at the opening session of this meeting.

In the first place, the historians do not seem to be agreed that their function involves any interpretation at all. To be sure, it is historical hearsay that all modern historical writing is from the "social point of

view." Nevertheless, from the sociological standpoint, it is a constant question whether the historians have so much as heard that there be any social point of view. The social point of view is that every event in human life, whether the actors get a glimpse of its meaning or not, is really a part of a co-operative process, in which each detail has a meaning that comes from its connection with the whole. This viewing the incident, whatever it is, as a partial expression of the whole, with consequent discovery of the whole in the incident, and of the incident in the whole—this is the essence of the social point of view. Men who write history from any other outlook are simply newspaper reporters whose items are out of date.

But, beyond this fundamental difference, the quarrel of the sociologists with the historians is that the latter have learned so much about how to do it that they have forgotten what to do. They have become so skilled in finding facts that they have no use for the truths that would make the facts worth finding. They have exhausted their magnificent technique in discovering things that are not worth knowing when they get through with them. These discoveries may be taken up by somebody else and brought into their meaning relations, but history, as it is mostly written to-day, does not come within sight of those relations. The historians are locating cinders on the face of the glacier, but they overlook the mountain ranges that carry the glacier.

When we once start to study human affairs, there is no stopping place, on any other ground than confession of mental incompetence, till we reach answers to these questions:—What are the essentials in human relations? In what varieties do these essentials appear

under different circumstances? How do we account for these universals and their accidents? What pointers does this knowledge give us about our own conduct?

In other words, we have not covered the first stage of social self-knowledge until we have summed up historical experience in terms of the perpetual rhythm of development, accommodation, and satisfaction of human interests; or, as Professor Giddings prefers to say, in terms of stimulus and response. The sociologists can do little toward this interpretation, that is, their perspective and range of induction would be viciously incomplete, without calling on the historians; but the historians' results are abortions if their growth is cut off before they pass into the stage of sociological generalization.

Referring now to certain details of Professor Giddings' argument, I would say that all possible difference of opinion among sociologists about its spirit and the strength of its main contention is a negligible quantity. His positions would have to be much less important than they are, however, if they could be accepted without reserve. In my own opinion, his primary hypothesis—"like response to stimulus" or "consciousness of kind"—is inferior in importance to his secondary hypothesis of the effect of environment upon population. The former seems to me much less ultimate and much less fruitful than to Professor Giddings. I am bound to confess, however, that other sociologists have taken up his idea and have agreed with his estimate rather than mine. To tell the truth I am sometimes worried by a suspicion that in my mental makeup there is some sort of a plagiaristic parasite that leads me to think an idea has always been familiar after someone has made it

plain. Perhaps that may account for my position in this instance, but since Professor Giddings first suggested this primary formula it has seemed to me that it either meant something which we had virtually taken for granted, and which we might accept without debate, or that it meant something more which would not prove to confirm its author's estimate.

Sociologists have not yet straightened out their ideas about popular misconceptions of physical science. We assume that something has been done which has not, and we are ambitious to duplicate that triumph in social science. We want to find the one "force" or the one "principle" that accounts for social history, just as we suppose the force of "evolution" or the principle of "natural selection" accounts for physical history. But in the sense in which we use the word, evolution is not a "force," it is a method, and an infinitely undiscovered method at that. "Natural selection" is not a "principle," it is a process, and the biologists to whom I go for information instruct me that they are just beginning to make out the rudiments of the process. What Lamarck, Darwin and Wallace generalized, and what Spencer phrased, is really the problem itself, not its solution. The scientists who are working on the philosophical frontier are busy in their approaches to the solution of the problem which these pioneers most successfully stated. Now, if Professor Giddings' generalization "like response to stimulus" or "consciousness of kind" carries any of this idea, that it identifies a force or principle that moves the world, I am unable to see the formula in that light. If, on the other hand, the phrases are merely convenient generalizations of the problems which Professor Giddings brilliantly attacks with this secondary hypothesis, and then with his

psychological propositions, they serve a purpose, yet hardly of the capital order which their place in the argument must be understood to imply.

Before closing, I would express my admiration for the insight displayed in the third and fourth divisions of Professor Giddings' paper. I believe he has there reached some cardinal contributions to sociology. I cannot refrain from pointing out once more in this connection, however, that there is a vast void, which nothing but a new order of historical work can fill, between our present ignorance of actual social reactions and confirmation of such theories as Professor Giddings has proposed. We need to know, in the concrete, just how human interests have combined with each other in every variety of circumstance within human experience. There has never, to my knowledge, been a fairly successful attempt to schedule efficient human interests in general, till Ratzenhofer did it less than ten years ago in *Das Wesen und Zweck der Politik*. With this work sociology attained its majority. Henceforth all study of human relations must be rated as provincial, which calculates problems of life with reference to a less comprehensive scheme of interests than his analysis exhibits.

The sociologists are settling down to as strict and positive analysis of the sort of thing that takes place in human reactions as the chemists have carried on in their sphere. Men in other divisions of labor within the social sciences cannot afford to leave the sociologist out of the account. Professor Giddings' position is impregnable, that we have something to say to each other, and that each of us needs the other's help for the completion of his knowledge.

CHARLES HORTON COOLEY: In discussing this notable paper I wish to confine myself to only one of the fundamental questions upon which it touches, namely, that of the nature of history as regards cause and effect; and my aim will be to distinguish three ways of thinking about it; first, the materialistic, second, the idealistic, third, what I would call the organic. In the preference I shall avow for the last, I hope that the distinguished author of the paper will, on the whole, agree with me, though I am not sure that he does not, here and there, show a certain leaning toward the first.

The materialistic view assumes that physical conditions are in some sense original and ultimate causes of the movements of history; that they are primary, as compared, at least, with such complex products of the mind as institutions and social ideals, which are held to be secondary or derivative, though perhaps of equal immediate importance. The best-known representative of this way of thinking is Herbert Spencer, whose whole philosophy assumes the primacy of material facts and aims to show how mental and social facts grow out them.

The primacy claimed for material elements must, I suppose, be a primacy either in time or in logic. As to time, I am unable to see from what I have learned of history and anthropology, that the physical aspect of life came before institutions and ideals, or was, generally speaking, of relatively greater importance in the past than at present. No doubt institutions and ideals have greatly developed, but no more, perhaps, than have economic activities. To me these seem to be co-ordinate phases of existence which have ever marched side by side. When I look back through the past I seem to see

human nature, language, institutions, modes of conflict, modes of getting a living, philosophies and aspirations, ever as one indivisible life, even as they are at present ; although certainly the whole and every phase of it becomes cruder as we go back. We have learned from the works of Professor Giddings that we can no longer regard human nature as separable from language and other institutions ; the individual no more created these things than they created him, all is one growth. Even poetry is, in a sense, as old as man himself ; for language is truly said to be fossil poetry, and language and human nature, we now believe, arose together.

But have not the economic activities at least a primacy in logic, as being the necessary basis of every thing else ?

I cannot see that the getting of food, or whatever else the economic activities may be defined to be, is any more the logical basis of existence than the ideal activities. It is true that there could be no ideas and institutions without a food-supply ; but no more could we get food if we did not have ideas and institutions. All work together, and each of the principal functions is essential to every other.

I am not sure that the feeling of the primacy of material conditions has any better foundation than their tangible and visible character which makes them stand out more clearly before the mind and gives an illusion of their independence. As they exist in society, or for us, they are really as plastic and changeable as thought itself. Social and psychological science is, in my opinion far too complaisant to that prejudice of the physical scientist which identifies the ideal with the vague, and wishes to have as little to do with it as possible.

I do not object to the interpretation of history from the materialistic point of view, so long as it is recognized that this is partial, deserving no logical preference over the idealistic point of view, and always needing to be balanced by the latter. But, so far as I have noticed, writers who start from material data are inclined to hold not merely that this is *a* place to start but that it is *the* place; and, if so, I think they are justly chargeable with materialism.

I do not quite agree with the paper in the view that materialistic interpretations fail to satisfy us only because they have not explained the ideal. I should not be content with seeing how the ideal proceeds from the material, but I should wish also to begin at the other end and see how the material, as it exists in society, proceeds from the ideal. The industrial society of the nineteenth century for instance, is perhaps as much the result of the institutions and philosophies of the eighteenth as it is a cause of those which are to be in the twentieth. And, finally I should wish to unite these partial views so far as possible into a total or organic view, a perception of the living fact.

I will not dwell upon the merely idealistic view of history, since it has little vogue at the present time. It has as much one-sidedness as the other. Looking upon thought as the causal force in all life it treats things as no more than its symbols.

I would not, however, conceal my opinion that it is quite as plausible and legitimate, quite as scientific, if you please, to treat the human mind itself as the primary factor in life, and history as its gradual unfoldment, as it is to begin with the material. Why should the stimulus or spur of progress be ascribed to things more than to the mind itself?

The organic view of history denies that any factor or factors are more ultimate than others. Indeed it denies that the so-called factors—such as the mind, the various institutions, the physical environment, and so on—have any real existence apart from a total life in which all share in the same way that the members of the body share in the life of the animal organism. It looks upon mind and matter, soil, climate, flora, fauna, thought, language and institutions as aspects of a single rounded whole, one total growth. We may concentrate attention upon some one of these things, but this concentration should never go so far as to overlook the subordination of each to the whole, or to conceive one as precedent to others.

One who holds this view is not content to inquire whether the economic interpretation of history is the fundamental one. Back of that, he thinks, is the question whether there is, in fact, such a thing as a fundamental interpretation of history, in the sense that one aspect of society is in its nature more ultimate than others; whether life actually proceeds in a one-two-three manner, and not, rather, in a total manner, each special phase of it at any given time being derived not merely from some other special phase but from the total condition of mankind in the preceding epoch. He believes that life, go back as far as you will, is a progressive transformation of a whole, in which the ideal, institutional and material phases are co-ordinate and inseparable.

History is not like a tangled skein which you may straighten out by getting hold of the right end and following it with sufficient persistence. It has no straightness, no merely lineal continuity, in its nature. It is a

living thing, to be known by sharing its life, very much as you know a person.

In the organic world—that is to say in real life—each function is a center from which causes radiate and to which they converge; all is alike cause and effect; there is no logical primacy, no independent variable, no place where the thread begins. As in the fable of the belly and the members, each is dependent upon all the others. You must see the whole or you do not truly see anything.

Supposing that this organic conception is a just one, what practical bearing, let us ask in conclusion, has it upon the method of expounding or of comprehending history?

It by no means discredits the study of history from particular points of view, such as the economic, the political, the military, the religious. The whole is so vast that to get any hold of it we need to approach it now from one point of view, now from another, fixing our attention upon each phase in turn, as all the world did, a few years ago, upon the influence of sea-power when Captain Mahan's work appeared. But no study of a special chain of causes can be more than an incident in that perception of a reciprocating whole which I take to be our true aim.

If we think in this way we shall approach the comprehension of a period of history very much as we approach a great work of organic art, like a gothic cathedral. We view the cathedral from many points and at our leisure, now the front and now the apse, now taking in the whole from a distance, now lingering near at hand over the details, living with it, if we can, for months; until gradually there arises a conception of it

which is confined to no one aspect but is, so far as the limits of our mind permit, the image of the whole in all its unity and richness. And it is such a view as this at which we aim in the study of history. Every competent student may help us, whether his work is narrative or philosophical, large or minute, written from one point of view or several; but after all what we would like to get is nothing less than a living familiarity with the past, so that in the measure of our faculty, we might actually possess it in something of the various unity of life itself.

LESTER F. WARD : The time allowed for discussion seems to require its restriction to some one salient point in Professor Giddings' comprehensive paper. The strongest point he makes, as it seems to me, is that in which he treats the three stages in the development of a people, and which he correctly designates as those of unity, liberty, and equality respectively. These three stages may, however, with equal propriety be designated as so many different steps in the attainment of human freedom. The stage of unity may be called that of national freedom, the stage of liberty that of political freedom, and the stage of equality that of social freedom.

The first and prime requisite during the early efforts at nation forming, following upon conquest and subjugation, is the consolidation of the amalgamating group into a national unit capable of withstanding the encroachments and attacks of other outside groups. Until this is attained none of the subsequent steps can be taken. But it involves the elaboration of the crude and antagonistic materials into the only kind of order or organization of which they are capable, viz., the politico-military organization. The sali-

ent features of such an organization, are extreme inequality, caste, slavery, and stern military domination. It is during this stage that the individual system is sketched on the broad lines of social cleavage, resulting in the three great fundamental social tissues, the ruling class or ectoderm, the proletarian or entoderm, and the business class or mesoderm of the primitive state. They form a strong bulwark and enable the inchoate state to defend itself against hostile elements from without during the subsequent stages in social assimilation. They secure the first great prerequisite—national freedom.

But individual liberty is at its minimum. The conquered race, which always far outnumbers all other elements, is chiefly in bondage, and the great struggle for political liberty begins. Ultimately, as the history of the world shows, this is in large measure attained. Throughout antiquity, the Middle Ages, and down to the middle of the nineteenth century, this was the great, all-absorbing issue—political freedom. One after another the bulwarks of oppression—slavery, serfdom, feudalism, despotism, monarchy in its true sense, nobility and priestly rule—fell, the middle or business class (*bourgeoisie*) gained the ascendant, which it still holds, and political liberty was attained.

So all-important did this issue seem that throughout the eighteenth century and down to near our own time it was confidently believed that, with the overthrow of political oppression and the attainment of political freedom, the world would enter upon the great millennium of universal prosperity, welfare, and happiness.

But, as Professor Giddings has shown, this was far from the case. As sages predicted, events have proved that there remains another step to be taken. Another

stage must be reached before any considerable degree of the hopes that were entertained can be realized. Professor Giddings calls this the stage of *equality*. I prefer to designate it as the stage of *social freedom*. The world is to-day in the throes of this great third struggle. Military oppression and royal oppression have been abolished. Slavery, serfdom, feudalism, have disappeared. Autocracy and aristocracy no longer rule. The power of royalty, of the priesthood, of the nobility, has been broken. The civilized world is democratic, no matter by what name its governments are called. The people rule themselves by their sovereign votes. And yet, never in the history of the world was there manifested greater unrest or greater dissatisfaction with the state of things that exists to-day. National freedom and political freedom have been achieved. Social freedom remains to be achieved. The race struggle and the political struggle are practically over and we are in the midst of the industrial struggle. The military power, the sacerdotal power, and the power of the nobility have given way to the economic power or the power of wealth. This last is now being challenged by the industrial power or the power of labor. The first and second estates have surrendered their scepter to the third estate, which is as nearly "everything" as the Abbé Seyès could have desired. The ominous rumbling that we now hear in the lower strata of the social world is due to the coming to consciousness of the fourth estate. The social strata that consisted first of slaves and serfs and then of peasants and laborers, now embrace the voters of democratic states. It would be well if historians would turn aside for a time from the study of military and political events

and begin the study of the most important of all human events, the rise of the proletariat.

I have in these few words sought merely to state the problem, not to solve it. History will solve it as it solves all problems, and while it would be presumptuous of any one to venture a prediction, the history of the past seems at least to establish one principle, which is that the entire movement I have sketched is one movement, and that its direction is ever the same and irreversible.

GEORGE L. BURR: I have listened with much interest to the speculations of Professor Giddings. But, if you ask me as a student of history for a verdict upon them, I can only make the plea which I think the lawyers call "confession and avoidance". They are very fine. They may well be very true. But the thing of which Professor Giddings is talking is not history.

The law of language is use. Words, like people, have their vested rights. And history is an ancient word. From Herodotus to Mommsen it has had a recognized meaning. I am not so rash as to hazard here a definition: it is not needed. The very grievance of Professor Giddings is that the word has never meant what he would now make it mean. Supported by his charges, I may at least dare to admit that the theme of history *has* been the lives and deeds of individuals—individual men, individual peoples, individual states, individual civilizations,—that its method has been, not biologic, but biographic,—and that its prime aim, however obscured now and then by the prepossessions, theologic or sociologic, of a historian, has always been, in the simple phrase of Ranke, to learn and to tell "*wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*"—how it actually was.

But, says Professor Giddings, this is not a science. I do not know. I do not greatly care. It is not the sciences alone which have a right to their names and to their fields. There are the literatures and the arts. Science is, after all, but an old Latin word for knowledge; and I gladly grant that knowledge is not the highest aim of history. It is no historical sentimentalist, no mere quibbling pedagogue, but the great constitutional historian of England, who holds the chief worth of history to lie, not in the knowledge it gives, not even in its training of the imagination, the sympathy, the insight, the judgment, but in the growth it brings to him who studies it for its own sake. It is travel, acquaintance, experience, life. History *is* society. Where else will the sociologist find that past with which he deals? Even of yesterday he knows only through the newspaper; and the newspaper is history.

Yet is it so sure that history is not a science? It is, indeed, not a natural science. In the days of Pythagoras nothing could be a science which could not be reduced to terms of mathematics. In the Middle Ages all science was forced to be metaphysical. Only the syllogism was proof. To-day it is the turn of the natural sciences.

"I am the Master of this College,
What I know not is not knowledge."

To Professor Giddings, history, without classification and induction, is but "a chaos of unassorted facts." It must be developed like descriptive botany and comparative anatomy, and so made "a true explanatory science."

Yet even President Seligman allows us the alternative of being "a method." Is it quite sure, while as yet we have no admitted classification of the sciences, that a

method is not the adequate criterion of a science? And is it wholly clear that we have no field of our own, we who neither deduce nor generalize? When, in the process of nature, there came into existence the phenomena of organic life, there was born a need for something other than the physical sciences. There was nothing, even now, which physics might not weigh and chemistry analyze; but to the sympathetic understanding of the subtle processes of life there was a nearer and less clumsy way, and the biological sciences were born—botany and zoology, morphology and physiology. So, too, at a later stage, there come into view yet other phenomena,—the phenomena of personal consciousness and choice; and, not because of any break in the order of nature, but merely because of the accident that we ourselves are men and women, endowed with consciousness and choice, there is open to us a door for the immediate understanding of these conscious, choiceful acts. They need for us neither demonstration nor explanation: we see and we understand. The method of history, says Droysen, is "*forschend zu verstehen*."

Why, even the philosophers, who were wont so loftily to lay down the law for the sciences, have at last thought them to notice what history is, as well as what it ought to be. The experimental psychologists themselves, who seemed about to surrender to natural science the very stronghold of metaphysics, have come to our help. A Dilthey has shown why history must forever deal with the individual and the concrete, and must rest on biography as the social sciences do on anthropology. A Simmel has made it clear that the knowledge we gain of other men and other ages by living ourselves into their lives is a real knowledge. A Wundt has shown the impossibility of historical laws,

and has pointed out that even when history uses the comparative method, it is not, as in the natural sciences, for induction and generalization, but only to find for a group of phenomena their explanation within themselves or in the familiar laws of human nature. A Rickert has found in history the science of reality, the necessary complement of the sciences of abstraction and generalization.

I would like to meet the argument that a method which individualizes must lose itself in a wilderness of details; but I must not overstep my time. Yet I can not close without protesting that the historian has no wish to do without the generalizing sciences. Politics, economics, ethics, are not history; but they are indispensable to history. The audacious generalizations of a Buckle were not useless because the new science which they helped give birth is now called, not history, but anthro-geo-graphy. We are not the less grateful to a Taine because we must count much of his work folk-psychology. And even that ambitious comprehensive study, be it science or be it philosophy, which the Germans still call the philosophy of history, but which the followers of Auguste Comte in France and England and America prefer to know as sociology, may well have for us its own high use, if we can ever agree as to its province and its name.

But not less do these need history, and history as it is. History alone can teach them to find and to test their own materials. History alone can give them the atmosphere which permits their work.

WILLIS MASON WEST: On the train down from Chicago, and since our arrival in New Orleans, I have busied myself in collecting opinions of historians as

to what sociology is or ought to be. Of course, I have found no one who will accept as satisfactory the relationship between history and sociology set forth to-night by the sociologists. Indeed, I have found no one who believes that there can be a profitable sociology, as these gentlemen use the term;—no one who believes that there can be now a satisfactory philosophy of history and universal science of society. It is to be hoped that this will not disturb the sociologists any more than the sociologists' definitions of history disturb the historians.

If Professor Giddings' paper be representative of the sociologists' position, I do not despair of some slight progress even towards agreement, though it may be only agreement to let each other alone. The older sociologists have been somewhat too fond of implying that history for the most part is worthless, and that whatever of good there is in it may be found better in sociology. If we partially forgive these older writers, in consideration of the unscientific character of the older history, what shall we say of M. Taarde, who only the other day spoke flippantly of history as a "motley succession of fantastic paintings?" And what shall we say of those sociologists who have slipped into that tone in this discussion? Of course no headway is to be made in this way; historians are merely tempted to retort that sociologists can ill afford to fling these disagreeable missiles about so recklessly, until they move into less breakable and less transparent houses than those that have so far sheltered them.

Happily Professor Giddings is more just and more generous. He recognizes three stages in the study of past social events: a first stage where such events are arranged only according to chronology; a second stage where they are arranged according to likeness in func-

tion or structure; and a third stage, which he hopes *may be* attained, where they are "correlated with their underlying causes," so as to give a "rational, or explanatory arrangement." In the first stage, Professor Giddings calls this study history; in the second stage, he still calls it history; in the third stage he intends to call it—sociology! Now if this is merely a question of terminology, it does not matter; if, on the other hand, important practical consequences are to follow from the terminology, let us be clear as to what they are.

Professor Giddings recognizes that history has made "some progress" from the unsatisfactory chronological stage into the more scientific structural stage. It has advanced from the stage of the natural history of Buffon to the stage of the botany of Linnæus or the zoology of Cuvier. Very well! And when the Darwin comes, to organize history in a higher way, he may call it sociology if he wants to, but he must be a historian, as the Darwin of biology was a botanist and zoologist. The historians will acknowledge no terminology that conflicts with this fact; and for the present they deny the possibility of a Darwin for historical matter anyway. It is on these two points that Professor Giddings parts company with us.

Curiously enough, some have held the historians responsible for the division of the study of social life into wholly separate and reciprocally exclusive fields. This separation is just what the historians deny. It is our friends, the political scientists and the sociologists, who, coming late into the land, have built up their fences at will and warned the "mere historian" off their particular preserves; though, to be sure these gentlemen have a pleasant proneness to ignore their fences when they see anything they want on the historical side.

I trust I may be pardoned if I draw upon my personal experience for an illustration of this readiness to claim for other fields anything that the proprietors recognize as good in history. Some time since, I put forth a modest text-book in history. A friend of mine, who happens to be a professor of political science, speaks of the book to his classes, closing with the climax that Mr. West is not a "mere historian," but that he is really "something of a political scientist!" And then I have another friend who is a professor of political economy; this gentleman writes me delightful praise but adds that really I am, or ought to be, not a historian, but a political economist! I regret that I cannot complete the story by relating that I have been claimed in like manner as a sociologist. Had the book been good enough, no doubt I should have been so styled by some partial sociologist. But even then I should have been constrained to decline the compliment, along with these others, and to rest content with the title of a student and teacher of history,—“mere” history, too. At the same time, I have no objection in the world to these gentlemen coming into the historical field to gather wherewithal to build their theories; indeed, I only object that they don't come enough, and that they gather somewhat at random when they do come. No, it is not the historians who mark off exclusive fields.

Historians do object to any quaint assumption of a division of labor that tries to exclude them from reasoning about history. Possibly it would not be altogether unreasonable to object to an assumption that anyone else is better qualified than the historian to reason about history. The attitude of the men who theorize so freely on the results of the historians' work seems to us to be one or the other of these two positions.

Some of the theorists say to us, "Why, you go out, do the digging and grubbing; then bring us what you find, and we will tell you what it means; we will give it 'intelligible order.'" Is it possible these gentlemen wish to dance without paying the fiddler? Or is it simply that they fail to understand how much this dancing costs? In any case, there are two good reasons why such a differentiation of function will not come to pass. First, the historians will not take the part assigned; rest assured, if we find anything worth "arranging," we are going to arrange it ourselves, without consulting men who are not historians. And, secondly, we couldn't perform this act of self-effacement if we would; there are so few periods for which the history is yet definitely established (this is a historical secret, to be spoken in whispers) that only a student trained in historical method and practice can really tell what is good in historical writing and what is not—for the purpose of a final philosophy. And thus, when theorists who are not historians do dip into historical literature to get some basis for their ideal structures, the historians too often are moved to unholy mirth.

A more considerate school of theorists say only, as I understand Professor Giddings to do,—“But you historians *refuse* to generalize; and so we sociologists are forced to try to find some system for your facts.” Yes, historians do refuse to try any universal generalization. The sociologist may think it is because we are not so near the facts that we can't see relationships; we think, of course, that we appreciate better the tremendous complexity of the material, the absolute impossibility in the present condition of human knowledge of capturing the life of society with any one formula.

Some years ago at a meeting of this kind, if I remember rightly, a daring speaker told the sociologists that their "science" was only the "residuary legatee of a defunct and discredited philosophy of history." And in all seriousness I ask, what is sociology but an attempt to build a new philosophy of history,—a philosophy transformed by the new conceptions of physical science? Of course we agree with the sociologists that such a philosophy is highly desirable; the more optimistic of us hope that some time, in the dim future, it may be achieved. But we think that this philosophy, whenever it comes, will be built by historians; and we think its coming is so problematical, or at least so distant, that at present we need not concern ourselves with speculations about it. The sociologists courageously rush in, where historians—in closer touch with facts—decline to spin cobwebs. But we have no objection whatever to these other gentlemen theorizing all they please, however we may regret what seems to us misdirected effort; and even the most conservative among us will expect to draw useful hints or warnings from their guesses.

This then is the relation between history and sociology with which I am concerned. We must let each other alone, with as much of charity and good will as may be. The historian is willing that the sociologist should speculate upon history; but he does insist upon two things: the historian must be at liberty, *as a historian*, to reason upon history himself, so far as he sees it possible; and he must be allowed to carry his studies over from yesterday into to-day, when he thinks it expedient. He must be able to do these things without being called names,—either political scientist or sociologist. We will respect no fences that interfere with

our rights in these two matters. In return we will allow you gentlemen perfect liberty in our field,—and we will not call you historians, either.

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS: The only comment that I wish to make upon this discussion of my paper may be put in the form of a question. Do the historians wish to include the problems of social causation within the field of history, or to exclude them, as foreign to the historians proper task? I care nothing for mere labels. If history properly comprehends an examination of the problems that I have set before you to-night—and I gather from the remarks of Professor Burr and Professor West, that they think it does—I am quite as ready to hear these studies called history as to hear them called sociology. If, however, history has no business to meddle with such questions, and if the historian ought to hold—as I understand Professor Emerton to hold—that the study of social causation is an impossible undertaking, that can end only in vague and worthless generalization—the historian cannot reasonably object if those who, like myself, hold a different opinion, take to themselves another name, and attempt in their own way to build up a branch of science in which these problems are made the central themes of investigation.